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This paper examines the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Conduct Panel 
Act 2004 (the "Act"), which implements a formal procedure to receive 
complaints about judicial conduct. It analyses the Act from the perspective of 
the balance it achieves between the two fundamental principles, and frequently 
opposed principles, of judicial independence and accountability . The Act sets 
up distinct procedures for minor complaints, and complaints of sufficient 
gravity to warrant consideration of removal. These procedures are analysed 
separately. 
For the treatment of minor complaints, the Act preserves the existing situation 
where the Head of the Bench considers complaints informally and in private. 
The major initiative in the Act is in the creation of a mandatory investigation 
procedure that must precede the removal of a judge. 
This paper concludes that the Act strikes an appropriate balance between 
independence and accountability. While the Act does not implement a wholly 
transparent complaints procedure, particularly in relation to minor complaints, it 
provides for an independent judiciary. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
All the hallmarks of the judiciary flow from its central role of adjudicat ion. 
Judges must be impartial so they can fairly decide between conflicting positions. 
Judges must be independent so that they will be able to act impartially and be seen 
to act impartially.1 
Accountability of the judiciary cannot now be seen in isolation. ft must be 
viewed in the context of a general trend to render governors answerable to the 
people in ways that are transparent, accessible and effective.2 
Judges are influential members of society. They have the authority to 
resolve disputes, grant rights, and impose obligations. 3 The public therefore 
wants judges, as with all public office holders, to account to society for the way 
they carry out the judicial function . It is uncontroversial that judges should, and 
do, account for the decisions they make. In addition, the public calls for judges 
to account for their conduct. 
This desire to hold judges accountable for their conduct must be placed 
in context. It is a long-established principle that a pre-requisite for an impartial 
justice system, is an independent judiciary. Judicial independence requires that 
judges are free to make their decisions based purely on the law and their 
conscience; without fear or favour. 4 The risk is that the more judges are held to 
account, the greater the likelihood that improper pressure is placed on them.5 
The paradox is that public confidence in justice relies on both judicial 
independence and accountability. If judges are not independent, and do not 
deliver impartial decisions, public confidence suffers. To restore confidence, 
1 Rt Hon Beverley McLachlin "The Supreme Court and the Public Jnterest" (200 l) 64 Sask L 
Rev 309,311 
2 Hon Michael Kirby "Judic ial Accountability in Australia" (Commonwealth Legal Education 
Assoc iation , Brisbane, 6 October 200 I), 6. 
3 McLachlin, above n I, 311. 
4 Canadian Judicial Counci I "Ethical Principles for Judges" ( 1998) 8 ["Ethical Principles for 
Judges"]. 
5 Vince Morabito "The Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW): A Dangerous Precedent of a Model 
to be Followed?" ( 1993) 16(2) U NSWLR 481, 490. 
accountability for conduct may be necessary. In holding judges accountable 
however, this could threaten their independence. 
Are judicial accountability and independence absolutes opposed, or is it 
possible they can be complementary? The recent enactment of the Judicial 
Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004 (the "Act"),6 goes 
to the heart of this issue. The Act implements a general statutory complaints 
system to receive all complaints made about judicial misconduct. It also lays 
down a mandatory procedure for the removal of all judges. The dual purpose of 
the Act is to "enhance public confidence" in the judicial system through 
implementing a strong complaints system, and to "protect the impartiality and 
integrity of the judicial system".7 
This paper analyses the Act from the perspective of the balance it 
achieves between judicial independence and accountability. In doing so, 
reference is made to the New South Wales and Canadian formal complaints 
procedures that provided the explicit models for the New Zealand Act. This 
paper makes a division in analysis between complaints that do not raise 
consideration of removal (referred to as "minor" complaints), and those that do. 
The first section sets out the principles of judicial independence and 
accountability. The second outlines the situation relating to judicial misconduct 
before the Act. It sets out the informal complaints system designed to receive 
minor complaints, and the statutory provisions providing for the removal of 
judges in exceptional cases of misconduct. The third section looks at why the 
New Zealand Government decided to formalise the complaints procedures. The 
fourth sets out the New Zealand Act, and the New South Wales and Canadian 
equivalents. The fifth analyses the minor complaints procedure under the Act. 
The final section looks at the removal procedures. 
6 The Act developed out of the Judicial Matters Bill. It will come into force on a date appointed 
by the Governor-General through an Order in Council. 
7 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 4. 
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This paper concludes that Act reaches an appropriate balance between 
independence and accountability. While it does not substantively increase 
accountability for minor complaints, this is the right choice. Removing the 
ability of the judiciary to self-regulate would have implications for judicial 
independence. It also concludes that the process that must precede the removal 
of a judge is sound. It is an open investigation procedure that is harmonious 
with judicial independence. The only reservation with the Act is the power it 
gives to the Attorney-General in the investigation process. 
II PRINCIPLES IN TENSION 
The two fundamental principles that underlie the Act are judicial 
independence and accountability. The purpose of the Act is to "enhance public 
confidence in, and to protect the impartiality and integrity of the judicial 
system", through the new complaints procedure.8 This is an ambitious dual 
purpose, and it is important to understand what judicial independence and 
accountability mean, when they are complementary, when they are antagonistic. 
A Judicial Independence 
Judges serve the public.9 The primary role of a judge is to resolve 
disputes arising on the application of the law, whether between citizens or 
between a citizen and the state. They uphold the rule of law in society, and act 
as a shield against unwarranted incursions on the freedoms of individuals by the 
state. 10 Judges are immensely important to the litigants that appear before them 
because they can grant the individual rights , or conversely, impose 
obligations. 11 The individual litigant, and citizens generally, want to be assured 
that any given judge will dispense the law impartially. Society wants the judge 
to apply the law free from bias; actual or perceived. 12 
8 Judicia l Conduct Conunissioner and Judicial Conduct Pane l Act 2004, s 4. 
9 McLachlin, above n I, 3 I 0. 
IO Ell V Alberta (2003] sec 35 para 22 Major J. 
11 Therrien c Quebec [200 I] sec 35 para 108 Gontheier J . 
12 Lippe c Charest 39 QAC 241 para 61 Lamer J. 
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Ensuring that judges are independent is the most effective way to secure 
impartial decision-making. The perception of judicial independence is also 
central to the public's confidence in the administration of justice. Independence 
and impartiality, while interrelated, are distinct concepts . Judicial independence 
is valued insofar as it is the means to the greater end of impartial decision-
making. 
At the heart of judicial independence is the idea that judges must be able 
to freely make their decisions based on the law without fear or favour. 13 The 
principle of judicial independence, which began with this very simple 
proposition, has expanded and strengthened over the years. There is a now 
commonly accepted "two-pronged" articulation of judicial independence where 
individual independence and institutional independence are seen as separate, yet 
complementary.14 
1 Individual Independence 
Individual independence, the historical core of judicial independence, 
requires that judges are able to discharge the judicial functions without outside 
interference, 15 and without regard to self-interest. Individual independence is 
concerned purely with the adjudicative function and the dispensing of justice in 
every case. 16 An issue for individual independence is whether the presence of a 
formal complaints system will in any way impinge on the freedom of judges in 
the adjudicative role. 
To be independent, and to be seen to be independent, a judge must have 
financial security and security of tenure. 17 Secmity of tenure requires that the 
government should not dismiss a judge when he or she makes an unpopular 
decision. The Supreme Court of Canada, taking this concept further, stated that 
a judge could only be removed from office for serious and very specific reasons 
13 " Ethical Principles for Judges", above n 4, 8. 
14 Moreall -Berube c NoL1 veaL1-8runswick [2002] SCC 11 para 56 Arbour J. 
15 Application under s 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re [2004] SCC 42 para 172 Le Bel J. 
16 Mackin v New Brunswick (Minister of lllstice) (2002) SCC 13 para 39 Gonthier J. 
17 Application L111der s 83. 28 of the Criminal Code, above n 15, para 171. 
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following an independent review where the judge is able to speak and defend 
him or herself. 18 
In New Zealand, security of tenure is enshrined in section 23 of the 
Constitution Act 1986. A Judge of the High Court (including the Court of 
Appeal) cannot not be removed except by the Governor-General acting on an 
address from the House of Representatives. An address may only be moved on 
the grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity to discharge the functions of judicial 
office. 19 There is an equivalent provision in the District Courts Act 1947 where 
the Governor-General, on the advice of the Minister of Justice, can remove a 
District Court Judge on the grounds of misbehaviour or inability.20 
Security of tenure is relevant to an analysis of the new judicial 
complaints system because the Act sets up a procedure that could lead to the 
dismissal of a judge. Two particularly important questions in this context are 
whether the tenure of judges is strengthened by the new investigation process, 
and whether greater power over the tenure of judges has been placed in the 
hands of the executive at the expense of parliament. 
2 Institutional Independence 
Institutional Independence attaches to the judiciary as an institution, and 
requires that the judiciary is separate, in fact and appearance, from both 
parliament and the executive. Institutional independence ties closely into the 
theory of separation of powers in that it demands there is independence between 
the judiciary and the two other branches.21 
If the courts are going to fulfil their role as protector of individual rights 
and liberties, they must necessarily be independent from the branches that might 
seek to diminish those rights and liberties.22 The appearance of separation is 
18 Application under s 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re, above n 15, para 171. 
19 Constitution Act 1986, s 23 . 
20 District Courts Act 1947, s 7. 
2 1 Application under s 83. 28 of the Criminal Code, above n 15, para 179. 
22 Ell v Alberta, above n I 0, para 22. 
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central to public confidence in the administration of justice. For if the public 
does not believe that the judiciary is acting independently, and protecting their 
rights against governmental excesses, there will be a loss of faith in the justice 
system as a whole. When such a loss of faith occurs, the judiciary cannot claim 
legitimacy or command the respect and acceptance essential to the judicial 
function. 23 
The impact that the Act may have on institutional independence is more 
subtle than any possible impact it may have on individual independence. The 
Act may set up an independent process to investigate complaints about judicial 
misconduct, but it also gives greater control to the Executive, through the 
Attorney-General, over judicial tenure. The new system therefore creates the 
possibility of a relationship of influence flowing from the Executive to the 
Judiciary . 
B Judicial Accountability 
This is an age where there is an increasing call for the accountability of 
all those who "wield public power".24 Members of government have the power 
to make decisions that impact on society as a whole through the positions that 
they hold. Society authorises members of government to exercise power on the 
condition that they account for their actions. 25 Members of Parliament are held 
accountable through regular public elections. The public service is increasingly 
accountable for its decisions through the development of judicial review and the 
creation of the Ombudsman. The judiciary, being the third branch of 
government, does not escape the call for greater accountability. 
Judges, who hold a unique position in society, unquestionably need to 
account to society. While judges do not have the explicit role of making the 
law, they strongly influence the development of it. In deciphering the law, and 
23 Mackin v New Brun swick (Ministe r of Justice), above n 16, para 38. 
24 Kirby, above n 2, 3. 
25 Kirby, above n 2, 6. 
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deciding between competing interpretations,26 judges are making very 
significant decisions. They are particularly important in the development of the 
common law where judges develop rights and impose obligations, without the 
direction of parliament. 
Judicial accountability is necessary not only for the reason that judges 
are powerful, but also because public confidence in the judiciary relies on a 
judiciary that is held accountable. The integrity of the judiciary diminishes if 
the public perceives that its behaviour is unchecked. 
While it is obvious that accountability is necessary, the more difficult 
question is deciding on the form and extent to which it should take. Enhancing 
judicial accountability is a delicate exercise because it is absolutely necessary to 
ensure that any "changes do not place the critically important constitutional 
value of judicial independence at risk".27 The New Zealand Law Society is wary 
about increasing accountability:28 
Judges it is said, are public servants who must, like all other public servants, be 
"accountable for their actions". "Accountability", and other buzz words like 
"transparency" and "robust process", are tossed about as if their frequency of use 
makes them inevitably applicable to every situation, even if their meaning often 
remains obscure. 
The first step is to decide what accountability should mean in the judicial 
context, and the next is to look at how accountability should be increased. 
1 Accountability for the judicial function 
The most important function of a judge is to adjudicate disputes, and it is 
beyond doubt that the judiciary should be, and has for a long time been, 
accountable to the public for the way that it discharges this function. 29 Judges 
26 Peter Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (3ed, Carswell, Toronto, 1992) I 21. 
27 Antonio Lamer "The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core Values in 
Ti mes of Change" (1996) U NB L J 3, 12. 
28 New Zealand Law Society "Submissions on the Judicial Matters Bill" para 16. 
29 Lamer, above n 27, 13. 
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are required to hold their hearings in public, and they are required to issue a 
judgment setting out the reasons for the decision. The public judgments are also 
rigorously scrutinised by the media. These requirements mean that the public 
gain insight into why the judge reached the particular decision and this makes it 
easier for an individual to challenge it. 
The appeal and review processes are the most direct way that judges are 
held to account. If a judge makes an error of law, or holds biases for or against 
those who appear in court, a higher court will correct these mistakes. The 
appeal process therefore addresses the greatest concern for members of the 
public, and that is that justice was not delivered. 
2 Accountability for judicial conduct 
While it is uncontroversial that judges must be held accountable in their 
official capacity, the extent to which judges should be accountable for their 
conduct is more contentious. Before assessing the need for accountability, it is 
firstly necessary to understand the importance of judicial conduct to the public's 
confidence in the administration of justice. 
Judges hold a umque position m society and that is why judges are 
expected to be beyond the judgment of others; they are in a "place apart" in our 
society.30 The public asks not only that judges serve the ideals of truth and 
justice but that they also embody them. 31 This demands a high standard of 
conduct for it asks that judges are an example of impartiality, independence and 
integrity, and this is much more than is expected from any other member of 
. 3? society. -
The public loses confidence in the justice system when a judge is 
insulting, racist, sexist, intemperate to those who appear before them, or makes 
30 Therrien c Quebec (Minister of Justice), above n 11, paras 111-112. 
31 TherriencQuebec(MinisterofJusrice),aboven II.para 109. 
32 Therrien c Quebec (Minister of Justice), above n 11, para 111. 
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statements that suggest that he or she has prejudged a particular issue.33 
Comments and behaviour, both in and outside the courtroom, can lead to the 
impression that the particular judge is not impartial. To restore public 
confidence in the judiciary when there have been instances of misconduct, it is 
necessary that the public can see that behaviour of judges does not go 
unchecked. Judges are already accountable for their conduct in a number of 
ways. 
When misconduct occurs in the discharge of judicial duties, and is 
alleged to have impacted on the decision in a case, the appeal and review 
procedures are designed to respond to this. The New Zealand Law Society 
argues that where a review or appeal succeeds on the grounds of judicial 
misconduct, this amounts to a "substantial public rebuke". 34 
Judicial conduct is routinely scrutinised by the media and cases of 
judicial misconduct, such as the allegations of false accommodation and travel 
expense claims made against Judges Beattie and Hesketh,35 do make the 
headlines. Is media scrutiny of judicial misconduct in New Zealand diluted 
however, by the offence of contempt of court, and scandalising the judiciary in 
particular? 
Scandalising the judiciary arises when there is interference with the 
administration of justice, and a publication calculated to lower the authority of 
the judge and the court, may be in contempt of court. 36 Members of the media 
could be guilty of scandalising the court if they attribute improper motives to a 
judge.37 As the High Court noted in the recent case of Solicitor-General v 
Nicholas Rex Smith, scandalising does not exist to "protect the ego or feelings 
33 "Ethical Principles for Judges", above n 4, 32. 
34 New Zealand Law Society, above n 28, para 24. 
35 Rob Drent " Beattie: A Question of Integrity" ( 3 August 1997) Sunday Star Times Auckland 
5. 
36 Solicitor-General v Radio Avon [ 1978] I NZLR 225, 231 Richmond P. 
37 Solicitor-General v Radio Avon, above n 36,230. 
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of individual Judges. It is to prevent the undermining of public confidence in 
the competence and integrity" of judges "and thus the authority of the courts.
38 
It is rare in New Zealand for anyone to be found guilty of scandalising 
the court, yet Solicitor-General v Radio Avon and Solicitor-General v Nicholas 
Rex Smith both show that the offence exists and is used. The mere existence of 
scandalising might discourage media scrutiny of judicial propriety. It is 
therefore particularly important in New Zealand that other mechanisms exist to 
hold judges to account. 
In 1999, the Government created an informal complaints system to 
receive all complaints about judicial misconduct that cannot be dealt with 
through the appeal and review processes. Under this system, the Head of the 
Bench receives all of the complaints and has the ability to look into them and 
discuss the complaint with the judge concerned. This process takes place 
behind closed doors. The question is whether there was a need for further 
accountability in the form of a statutory complaints process? 
C Balance Between Judicial Independence and Accountability 
If the judicial system is to have legitimacy, the judiciary must command 
the respect and support of the public . Public confidence depends both on an 
independent judiciary delivering impartial decisions, and an accountable 
judiciary. A problem in New Zealand is that although the public is clear that 
accountability is necessary, it poorly understands the significance of judicial 
. d d 39 m epen ence. It is true that greater accountability strengthens the justice 
system because it ensures that judges do not go unchecked. Yet it is equally 
true, that if further accountability erodes judicial independence, this will 
severely weaken the judicial system. 
38 Solicitor-General for New Zealand v Nicholas Rex Smith (24 March 2004) HC WN CIV 2003 
485 J 8 J I, 29 J udgment of the Court. 
39 Hon Sian Elias" 'The Next Revisit ': Judicial Independence 7 Years On" (Neil Williamson 
Memorial Lecture, Chri stchurch, 30 Jul y 2004) 2. 
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The difficulty with securing both independence and accountability lies in 
the fact that there does come a point when the two principles are antagonistic. 
The more that society scrutinises the behaviour of judges and holds them to 
account, " the greater the likelihood that attempts will be made to exert improper 
pressure on them".40 Tied closely to this is that the more judges are scrutinised, 
the more restriction they may feel. 
Public confidence cannot be an absolute touchstone when considering an 
appropriate complaints system for several reasons. Firstly, what does public 
confidence actually mean? It is a diffuse concept. Secondly, the public is often 
completely uniformed; public confidence feeds off the media who do not always 
provide a balanced perspective. While it is important to secure public 
confidence, it is more important to secure an independent judiciary that delivers 
justice. 
III ACCOUNTABILITY BEFORE THE ACT 
Before the Act, there were already mechanisms in place to respond to 
complaints of judicial misconduct. The primary procedure, which largely 
remains in force under the Act, is an informal complaints procedure. This 
procedure is designed to deal with the raft of minor complaints made about 
judicial misconduct. In addition to this, there were also statutory provisions 
providing for the removal of a judge. These provisions responded to complaints 
alleging very serious misconduct. They too remain in force under the Act. 
A Informal Complaints Procedure 
In 1999, the Chief Justice Sir Thomas Eichelbaum, and the Minister of 
Justice Hon Doug Graham, introduced a complaints procedure that involved the 
Head of the Bench and a Judicial Complaints Lay Observer (the "JCL0").41 
The procedure got under way in 2001 when Hon Margaret Wilson made the first 
40 Morabito, above n 5, 490. 
4 1 Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer "Judicial Admini stration Issues" ( 1 Nove mber 2002) 27. 
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appointment of the JCL0.42 The Ministry of Justice issued a booklet, on behalf 
of the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General, titled "The Judicial Complaints 
Process", detailing the complaints procedure. 
Members of the public are only to use the complaints procedure where 
the complaint relates to judicial conduct. Where the complaint concerns the 
outcome of a case, the complainant is instructed to use the review and appeal 
processes. The distinction between judicial conduct and the outcome of a case 
is not entirely straightforward. Where judicial misconduct occurs in court, it 
can lead a litigant to the impression that the judge did not make an impartial 
decision in a particular case. Therefore, a complainant could be concerned both 
with the conduct of a judge and the outcome of a case. The intention is that 
where misconduct is perceived to have affected the result of a case, this can, and 
should, be remedied through the appeal and review processes. Where on the 
other hand, misconduct is not alleged to have impacted on a case, but is 
nonetheless inappropriate, the complaints procedure is designed to respond to 
this. 
All complaints made about the conduct of a judge are to be made to the 
Head of the Bench, and the booklet "broadly" summarises the procedure that 
takes place from that point on.43 It is important to note that the steps set out are 
not compulsory and the complainant does not have a right to enforce them. 
Rather, they are guidelines for the procedure that should take place on receipt of 
a complaint. 
When the Head of the Bench receives a complaint, he or she will first 
establish that the complaint concerns judicial conduct.44 Where the complaint 
does not relate to judicial conduct, the Head of the Bench advises the 
complainant of this and informs them about any other avenues, such as appeal, 
that they could pursue. Provided that the complaint concerns judicial conduct, 
42 "Judicial Complaints Lay Observer Appointed" (7 March 2001) 
<http://www.scoop.co. nz/mason/stories/P AO I 03/S00090. htm> (last accessed 29 September 
2004). 
43 Mini stry of Justice "The Judicial Complaints Process" (200 I) 2 ["The Judicial Complaints 
Process"]. 
44 "The Judicial Complaints Process" , above n 43, 2. 
12 
the Head of the Bench makes a preliminary decision about whether there is any 
substance to the complaint. If it appears that the complaint does have substance, 
the Head of the Bench refers the complaint to the judge in question, considers 
any response, and makes any further inquiries that he or she believes 
appropriate.45 Where the Head of the Bench proceeds with these inquiries, the 
complainant is notified of this. 
When the Head of the Bench decides that a complaint has substance in 
fact, the booklet sets the general parameters for what the Head of the Bench 
might do. The Head of the Bench decides on the appropriate action, and he or 
she can consider options such as asking the judge to convey an apology to the 
complainant, or offering the judge appropriate assistance to avoid such conduct 
in the future. 46 While appropriate action is not limited to the above two options, 
there is no further indication about what the Head of the Bench might do. It is 
quite possible that the Head of the Bench will not take any action . 
The complaints procedure also includes a review by a non-statutory 
appointment, the Judicial Complaints Lay Observer ("JCLO"). When the Head 
of the Bench makes the preliminary finding that the complaint is without 
substance, the complainant is advised both of this finding and of the right to 
refer the complaint to the JCL0.47 
The JCLO has the power to review the complaint, the way it was 
processed, any response from the judge, and any other relevant matters.48 The 
review and any inquiries are conducted in confidence. If the JCLO feels the 
decision not to pursue the complaint should be reconsidered, he or she can ask 
the Head of Bench to do so.49 The JCLO informs the complainant about 
whether reconsideration of the complaint is recommended to the Head of the 
Bench. 
45 "The Judicial Complaints Process", above n 43, 2. 
46 "The Judicial Complaints Process", above n 43 , 2. 
47 "The J uclicial Complaints Process", above n 43 , 2. 
48 "The Judicial Complaints Process", above n 43 , 3. 
49 "The Judicial Complaints Process", above n 43 , 3. 
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The JCLO is an integral part of the complaint process through providing 
an independent check on the consideration of complaints. The usefulness of the 
role is however limited. The JCLO is confined to recommending that the judge 
reconsider whether there is substance to the complaint, and the power is merely 
that, recommendatory. Moreover, the JCLO plays no part where a complainant 
believes the Head of the Bench did not take appropriate action once a finding of 
substance has been made. 
1 Problems statutory incorporation might introduce 
The informal complaints system has been running since 2001, and the 
question is whether formalising this process, as the Government has now done, 
could cause further problems. The New Zealand Law Society, in its submission 
on the Judicial Matters Bill, stated that formalising the complaints process could 
do more damage because of the impact it will have on judicial independence. 
There are several factors that can be advanced in support of this contention. 
Firstly, a concern the New Zealand Law Society raised, and a concern 
Judith Collins MP stressed during debate in the House,50 is that the mere 
existence of the statutory procedure will encourage people to make 
1 · 51 comp amts. The figures relating to complaints made under the informal 
complaints system show that most of the complaints are disguised forms of 
appeals.52 The New Zealand Law Society feels that a feature of the judicial 
system, and one that tends to be overlooked when considering complaints of 
judicial misconduct, is that there will always be litigants who are not satisfied 
with the result of a case. These litigants will use any available process to vent 
their frustration with the result of the case.53 
50 (4 September 2003) 611 NZPD 8404. 
5 1 New Zealand Law Society, above n 28, para 35. 
52 In 2001 , a total of 70 complaints were made against the benches combined. Of those, 33 were 
di sg ui sed forms of appeal. 
53 New Zealand Law Society, above n 28, para 36. 
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While judges do have to bear the burden of this behaviour, the New 
Zealand Law Society argues that judges are entitled to have a system that 
adequately protects them against these complaints. The statutory system, which 
may encourage more complaints, can only add to the pressures that judges 
already face. 54 The concern is that judges will feel further restriction when they 
are making decisions in court. 
In addition, the New Zealand Law Society argues that it is not 
appropriate to have a person with formal power scrutinising the behaviour of 
judges.55 If someone has the power to make an adverse finding about the 
conduct of a judge, they are in a position of superiority to the judge. 
While the New Zealand Law Society does raise valid concerns, the 
concerns do not inevitably lead to the conclusion that formalising the 
complaints system is not desirable. It is correct that a statutory system could 
lead to an increase in complaints, yet in itself this is not a negative consequence. 
In fact, if the increase is due to the fact that people with genuine complaints 
now have an obvious forum to take them, this is to be encouraged. Admittedly, 
there is likely to be an equivalent increase in complaints that are not genuine. It 
will therefore fall on the particular system to weed those complaints out at the 
earliest point. 
Providing a person with authority to look at the conduct of a judge is not 
a decisive criticism either. In any fonnal complaints procedure, someone is 
going to have the power to scrutinise the conduct of judges. The more 
important question is how closely the power is circumscribed to prevent 
manipulation of that power. 
B Removal of Judges from Office 
54 New Zealand Law Society, above n 28, para 36. 
55 The New Zealand Law Society submission was in response lo the Judicial Matters Bill, and so 
their complaint about a statutory officer is specific lo the Judicial Conduct Commissioner that is 
set up under the Act. 
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In the event of very serious judicial misbehaviour, there has always been 
statutory power to remove a judge from office. Section 23 of the Constitution 
Act 1986 empowers Parliament to make a motion to remove a High Court 
Judge, or an Employment Court Judge, on the grounds of misconduct or 
incapacity. The District Court Act 1947, governing the removal of a District 
Court Judge, permits the Governor-General to remove a District Court Judge on 
the grounds of inability or misbehaviour.56 The Minister of Justice is to advise 
the Governor-General when to make this decision.57 The issue is that these 
provisions represent the outcome, which is the removal of a judge, and do not 
set out the procedure that would identify serious misbehaviour or incapacity. 
As a judge has never been removed in New Zealand, there is no certainty 
regarding the procedure. 
A number of suggestions have been made about what could take place 
before Parliament made a motion for removal. The Ministry of Justice noted 
that Parliament would be free to establish a Select Committee Inquiry to 
investigate allegations of misconduct. 58 The concern with that is it would be 
unseemly for a judge to appear before a committee of Parliamentarians and 
justify his or her behaviour. Another option would be for Parliament to debate 
about the misbehaviour of a judge. It is equally possible that Parliament could 
make a motion for dismissal without carrying out any inquiry. The Constitution 
Act 1986 does not actually require that removal be on the grounds of "proven" 
misbehaviour. 
IV GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
The creation of the Act is indicative of the fact that the Government 
perceived problems both with the info1mal complaints procedure dealing with 
minor complaints, and the provisions governing the exceptional case of 
56 Di strict Courts Act 1947 , s 7. 
57 John McGrath "Judge M J Beattie: Section 7 District Courts Act l 947" (prepared for the 
Minister of Justice, l September 1997) 2 . 
58 Ministry of Justice "Response to the Justice and Electoral Committee: Initial Information 
Req uest" (5 February 2004) 17 [" Initial Information Request" ]. 
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misconduct where a judge should be removed. This section analyses the 
shortcomings with these procedures . 
A Problems with the I nf onnal Procedure 
It is difficult to pinpoint the problems with the informal system because 
little discussion was devoted to the procedure for minor complaints as the 
Judicial Matters Bill passed through the House. In fact several groups, 
particularly the New Zealand Law Society, argue that there were no such 
problems. The Law Society points to the fact that the Government did not have 
any empirical evidence to suggest that there was current dissatisfaction with the 
informal procedure,59 or that the number of complaints justified a change.60 As 
the procedure only began in 2001, there has been little time to gather any 
information. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, who undertook the initial review that sparked 
the later legislative progress, felt there was no suggestion the informal process 
was "fundamentally flawed". 61 The Government made changes however, and it 
is important to understand why. 
The purpose of the Act is to "enhance public confidence in, and to 
protect the impartiality and integrity of the judicial system". The Hon Margaret 
Wilson explicitly states that the "transparent" and "accessible" system will 
achieve the stated goals.62 The problems were therefore that the inf01mal 
complaint system was not accessible enough and that it lacked transparency. 
The informal complaints system was not an obvious mechanism, 
creating problems for accessibility. There is support for the fact that it was not 
obvious. Even though the established procedure was to make complaints to the 
Head of the Bench, complaints were made to both the Crown Law Office and 
h M . . f J · 63 t e 1111stry o ust1ce. A complaints system is not an effective mechanism 
if those who will use the system are unaware that it exists and how to use it. 
59 New Zealand Law Society, above n 28, para 28. 
60 New Zealand Law Society, above n 28, para 32. 
61 Palmer, above n 41, 27. 
62 (11 May 2004) 617 NZPD 12794. 
63 Ministry of Justice " Response the Justice and Electoral Commillee: Second Information 
Request" (20 February 2004) 8 ["Second Information Request"]. 
17 
The fact that the complaints system was not obvious has a further 
implication. As complaints were made to several bodies and there was not a 
uniform system for receiving them, it meant that it was difficult to collect data 
about the number of complaints and the grounds on which they were made. 
Neither the Ministry of Justice and the Crown Law Office kept a formal record 
of complaints.64 There was not a co-ordinated approach to complaints either, 
because the Ministry of Justice comments that it is not clear how many of the 
same complaints were also made to the Head of the Bench.65 
The lack of a formal record containing all complaints means that an 
effective response to judicial misbehaviour is less likely. Only when you can 
gather information about how and why judges are misbehaving can you target 
judicial education programmes in the necessary area. 
A further concern with the informal complaints system was the lack of 
transparency attaching to the complaints process. While the complainant was 
aware broadly aware of the procedure for dealing with a complaint through the 
outline provided in 'The Judicial Complaints Process", the complainant could 
not see how the Head of the Bench considered and responded to the complaint. 
Although the Head of the Bench could notify the complainant about the 
progress of the complaint, the process was not sufficiently transparent. 
The inclusion of the JCLO in the process alleviated, to some extent, the 
lack of transparency surrounding the role of the Head of the Bench. Through 
the power that the JCLO had to look at how the Head of the Bench considered 
the complaint, and recommend to the Head of the Bench to reconsider, an 
independent mechanism was available to an unhappy complainant. As the 
JCLO considered the complaint in confidence however, there is still a problem 
with transparency.66 Where a system is not transparent, the public cannot have 
absolute confidence in it. 
64 Second Information Request, above n 63, 8. 
65 Second Information Request, above n 63, 8. 
66 "The Judicial Complaints Process", above n 43, 3. 
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During debate in the House, Richard Worth MP commented that a 
problem with the adequacy of the informal complaints system was the response 
to judges who misbehaved.67 The Head of the Bench did not have any formal 
powers over other judges, and in fact played more of a counselling role towards 
the judge than a disciplinary role.68 The perception is that minor misconduct 
was not dealt with meaningfully. 
B Inadequacy of the Removal Provisions 
What mostly concerned the Government, and provided the impetus for 
the Judicial Matters Bill, was the lack of an established procedure to investigate 
the conduct of a judge preceding removal. The Government argued this lack of 
certainty could have strong consequences if it was not rectified before the 
question of removing a judge arose in New Zealand. The Government pointed 
to the implications such lack of certainty had in both Australia and Canada 
when allegations of serious misconduct were made against judges. Australia 
and Canada both set up ad hoe commissions to respond to allegations of serious 
misbehaviour, and in both countries there were negative repercussions. 
Canada had to respond to the question of removing a judge when serious 
allegations were made about the conduct of Justice Landreville. In 1964, the 
Attorney-General for Ontario laid charges against Justice Landreville.69 The 
accusation was that while Landreville was the Mayor of Sudbury, he had agreed 
to accept stock in a company called NONG, in return for using his influence to 
see NONG obtain a franchise agreement in Sudbury.70 After hearing the case, 
the Magistrate discharged it. 71 
Following this, the Law Society of Upper Canada formed a special 
committee to look into the conduct of Justice Landreville. Justice Landreville 
67 (l l May 2004) 617 NZPD 12796. 
68 Ministry of Justice "Response to the Justice and Electoral Committee: Third Information 
Reque t" (15 March 2004) 10 ["Third Information Request"]. 
69 Landreville v R (No.2) [ 1977) 2 FCR 726 para 25. 
70 Landreville v R ( No.2), above n 69, para 25. 
7 1 u:mdreville v R (No.2), above n 69, para 25. 
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first became aware of the inquiry when he was provided with a report 
recommending that the Law Society should not support him continuing to sit as 
a judge. Once this report entered the public arena, the Minister of Justice 
decided that in the interests of Justice Landreville, and the administration of 
justice, a formal inquiry was desirable.72 
In 1966, the Governor in Council appointed the Honourable Ivan Rand, 
a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, as a Commissioner of a Royal 
Commission of Inquiry.73 The Minister of Justice felt an Inquiry was more 
appropriate than introducing a motion directly in Parliament for several 
reasons.74 Firstly, there were factual disputes that needed to be determined.75 
Secondly, the decision to remove a judge from office was essentially judicial in 
nature, and it was felt that Parliament was an "unwieldy institution" for 
. . h f . 76 exerc1smg sue a unction. 
The inquiry was riddled with problems. While Justice Rand had been 
given clear terms of reference, he did not remain within them.77 No restrictions 
were placed on his right to compel witnesses, and similarly no restrictions were 
placed on procedure. The Rand Commission and its Report have been 
described as a "travesty of justice".78 Concern was also expressed over the fact 
that Government had the power to select a Royal Commission and "empower it 
to scrutinize the conduct of a superior courtjudge".79 
Commissioner Rand issued his report in August of 1966 and several 
weeks later it was tabled in the House of Commons.80 A special Joint 
Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons was then appointed to 
look into whether an address should be made to the Governor-General for 
72 Landreville v R (No.2) , above n 69, para 39. 
73 Landreville v R (No.2) , above n 69, para 5. 
74 Ed Ratushny "Speaking As Judges: How Far Can They Go?" (1999-2000) National Journal of 
Constitutional Law 293, 305. 
75 Ratushny, above n 74, 305. 
76 Ratushny, above n 74, 305. 
77 Ratushny, above n 74, 305. 
78 Ratushn y, above n 74, 305. 
79 Ratushny, above n 74, 305. 
80 Landreville v R (No.2 ), above n 69, para 6. 
removal.81 The Committee, after 19 meetings where they heard from Justice 
Landreville and read the report by Commissioner Rand, concluded that Justice 
Landreville had proven himself unfit for office. It recommended that an address 
for removal be made to the Govemor-General.82 Justice Landreville resigned 
shortly after the Committee reached its conclusion. 83 
The members of the Committee were not immune from criticism either. 
They were not seen to take their task seriously and their low attendance rate was 
indicative of this.84 A further problem was that there "was something unseemly 
about the fate of a judge being thrust into political hands". 85 
Concerns also surrounded an ad hoe investigation in Australia into the 
behaviour of Justice Murphy, a member of the High Court. The allegations led 
to a joint Federal New South Wales police task force inquiry, the establishment 
of two Senate Committees, a Commonwealth Parliamentary Commission of 
Inquiry, a Royal Commission of Inquiry and several appeals before the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal and the High Court.86 In New South Wales, the 
adverse publicity created by the allegations caused a loss of confidence in the 
· d" · 87 JU 1ciary. 
New South Wales and Canada responded to the failures of these ad hoe 
commissions by implementing formal complaints systems. The Landreville 
incident has been described as "a watershed in the historical development of an 
adequate institutional response to allegations of misconduct by superior court 
judges".88 
Australia and Canada both illustrate the fact that if there is not an 
established procedure, the investigation process can spiral out of control into a 
81 Landreville v R (No.2) , above 11 69, para 8. 
82 Landreville v R (No.2) , above 11 69, para 9. 
83 Landreville v R (No.2) , above 11 69, para JO. 
84 Ratush11y, above 11 74, 305. 
85 Ratush11y , above 11 74, 305. 
86 Morabito, above 11 5, 482. 
87 Morabito, above 11 5, 484. 
88 Ratush11y, above 11 5, 305. 
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number of separate inquiries. This is certainly not desirable from the 
perspective of the judge, or from the perspective of the public. Where the 
public is exposed to several inquiries dealing with the same allegation of 
misconduct, the adverse publicity can cause of loss of public confidence in the 
integrity of the judiciary. Margaret Wilson stated in the first reading in the 
House that a process should be set out in advance in New Zealand because a 
"hastily devised process may damage public confidence and impose risks to 
judicial independence."89 
V FORMAL COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES 
The New Zealand Government responded to the problems with informal 
complaints system for minor complaints, and the inadequacy of the removal 
provisions, by modelling a formal complaints system on the overseas precedents 
of New South Wales and Canada. This section describes both the New South 
Wales and Canadian systems, and then the New Zealand Act in greater detail. 
A New South Wales 
The Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) established a standing body 
called the Judicial Commission of New South Wales (the "Judicial 
Commission"). The most important of its three functions , for the purposes of 
this paper, is to deal with complaints made against judicial officers. The other 
two complementary functions are to provide judicial education and training, and 
to assist the courts in achieving consistency in the sentences they impose. 
The Judicial Commission receives all complaints that concern the ability 
or behaviour of a judicial officer. 90 The Commission is not to deal with a 
complaint however, where it does not raise the question of removal or it has not 
affected the performance of judicial duties .91 Where the Commission decides to 
deal with the complaint, it conducts a preliminary examination , and either 
89 (2 September 2003) 611 NZPD 8300. 
90 Judicial Officers Act l 986 (NSW), s I 5( l ). 
91 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 15(2) . 
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ismisses the complaint, classifies the complaint as minor, or as senous. 
Where the Commission classifies the complaint as minor or serious, the 
complaint is referred to the Conduct Division. The Commission does have the 
discretion however, to refer a minor complaint to the head of jurisdiction where 
the Commission does not think the complaint warrants the attention of the 
Conduct Division .93 
The Conduct Division comprises of three people who must all be either 
current or retired judicial officers. The Conduct Division examines a complaint 
and may hold a hearing in relation to it. 9
4 The default positions are that a 
hearing into a serious complaint takes place in public, and a hearing into a 
minor complaint takes place in private.95 
In relation to a serious complaint, the Conduct Division reports to the 
Governor its findings of fact, and its opinion as to whether the matter could 
justify parliamentary consideration of the removal of the judicial officer.
96 The 
Minister of Justice then lays the report before both Houses of Parl iament, 
97 and 
Parliament is able to initiate removal. The Houses of Parliament are unable to 
act without a report from the Conduct Division recommending re moval. 
B Canada 
The Judges Act 1971 , which applies to federally appointed judges, 
established a standing body called the Canadian Judicial Council (the 
"Council "). The Council, as with the New South Wales Judicial Commission, 
has several purposes, including the ability to investigate complaints made about 
the conduct of judges. The Council appoints a Judicial Conduct Committee to 
receive and deal with the complaints that are made, and designates a Chair of 
the Committee. 
92 Judi cial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 19. 
93 Judic ial Officers Act 1986 (NS W), s 2 1(2). 
94 Judicia l Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 24(2). 
95 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 24(2) . 
96 Judicia l Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 29(2) . 
97 Judici a l Officers Act I 986 ( SW), s 29(3). 
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The Chair of the Committee initially reviews the complaint and may 
dismiss the complaint either because it is trivial, vexatious, or without 
substance, or because the conduct of the judge is not so inappropriate that it 
warrants consideration of removal. 98 Where the judge recognises that the 
conduct is inappropriate or improper, the Council may express disapproval of 
the judge.99 For any complaint not dismissed, the Chair must refer it to a 
designated panel of the Judicial Conduct Committee_ Joo 
The Chair of the Judicial Conduct Committee designates a panel of up to 
five to assess whether the complaint should be dismissed, or recommend further 
investigation_ JOI Where the panel recommends further inquiries, the Council 
may decide to follow this recommendation, 102 and where it does so, appoints an 
I . C . 103 nquiry omm1ttee. 
There is also a fast-track procedure to the Inquiry Committee stage. 
Where the Minister of Justice or a provincial Attorney-General requests an 
inquiry into the conduct of a judge, the formal inquiry process takes place 
immediately without prior consideration of the Chair or the panel. 104 
The Inquiry Committee conducts a hearing into the complaint in public, 
. . I . 10s except m except1ona circumstances. After the hearing, the Inquiry 
Committee reports to the Council and states whether a recommendation for 
removal should be made. 106 The Council then considers the recommendation, 
reports to the Minister of Justice, and also submits the record of inquiry .107 
The Canadian removal procedure differs markedly from the New South 
Wales procedure in that the inquiry procedure laid out in the Judges Act 1972 
98 Canadian Judicial C ouncil By-Laws, 50(1 ). 
99 Canadian Judici a l Council By- Laws, 50(2). 
100 Canadian Judici al Council By- Laws, 53. 
10 1 Canadian Judicial Counc il B y- Laws, 55 . 
102 Canadian Judicia l Council B y-Laws, 57( 1). 
103 Canadian Judicial Council By-Laws, 57(2). 
104 Judges Act 1971 (C), s 63( 1). 
105 Canadian Judici a l Counc il By- Laws, 63. 
106 Canadian Judici a l Council By- Laws, 65. 
107 " Initial Informati on Request", above n 58, 7. 
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does not affect the powers of the House of Commons or the Senate. Parliament 
retains the ability to dismiss a judge from office irrespective of the finding of 
the Counci 1. 
C The Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 
2004 
The New Zealand Act is modelled very closely on the New South Wales 
and Canadian procedures, and the differences are more detail than substance. 
The Act implements a formal procedure to receive all complaints, irrespective 
of gravity. It is important to note however, that it maintains distinct systems for 
the treatment of minor complaints, and the treatment of complaints that might 
warrant consideration of removal. 
1 The Judicial Conduct Commissioner 
The Act establishes an office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner 
(the "Commissioner"). The Governor-General appoints the Commissioner on 
the recommendation of the House of Representatives. 
108 Before the 
recommendation is made, the Attorney-General must consult the Chief Justice 
about the proposed appointment. 109 The inclusion of Parliament and the Chief 
Justice in this process is important because the Commissioner must have the 
support of both Parliament and the Judiciary if he or she is going to successfully 
fulfil the role of investigating alleged misconduct of judges. The Act does not 
specify any criteria for appointment, and there is no requirement for the 
Commissioner to have legal qualifications. 
All members of the public are entitled to make a complaint, the 
Attorney-General may refer a matter concerning the conduct of a judge, and the 
Commissioner may on his or her own initiative look into the conduct of the 
judge. 110 The Commissioner is to receive all of the complaints that are made 
108 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 7(2). 
109 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 7(3). 
110 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 12. 
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about the conduct of a judge irrespective of whether the complaint arises in the 
exercise of the judge's judicial duties. 111 
When the Commissioner receives a complaint he or she must 
acknowledge the complaint in writing, and notify the judge concerned that the 
complaint has been made. 11
2 The Commissioner must examine the complaint, 
and in doing this, is able to seek a response from the Judge concerned, make any 
necessary inquiries, obtain any court documents, and consult the Head of the 
Bench. 113 These preliminary inquiries are carried out in private. When the 
Commissioner has completed the preliminary examination, the Commissioner 
can take three possible courses of action. 114 The decision of the Commissioner, 
as to which course of action he or she takes, is subject to judicial review. 115 
These options available to the Commissioner, set up the distinct procedures for 
the treatment of minor and serious complaints. 
Where the complaint fails to meet the threshold set out in section 16 of 
the Act, the Commissioner must dismiss the complaint. Grounds for dismissal 
include that the complaint has no bearing on judicial functions or duties, that the 
complaint is frivolous or vexatious or not in good faith, that the subject matter 
of the complaint is trivial, or that it relates to a judicial decision and should 
therefore be dealt with through the appeal or review process. 116 
Where the Commissioner believes that an inquiry into the complaint is 
justified, and that if substantiated could warrant consideration of removal, the 
Commissioner may recommend that the Attorney-General appoint a Judicial 
Conduct Panel to inquire into the alleged conduct. 117 As the Act does not 
specify when an inquiry is "justified", and the decision to recommend the 
formation of Conduct Panel is discretionary, the Commissioner has a lot of 
control over the types of complaints that may proceed to an investigation. 
111 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 11. 
112 Judicial Conduct Commjssioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 14. 
11 3 Judicial Conduct Commi ssioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 15. 
114 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 15. 
11 5 "Third Information Request", above n 68, 7. 
11 6 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 16. 
11 7 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 200..i, s 18. 
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Where the Commissioner does not dismiss the complaint, and does not 
recommend the formation of a Conduct Panel, he or she must refer the 
complaint to the relevant Head of the Bench. 118
 This is the minor complaints 
procedure. While the Act does not set out the procedure from that point, the 
Government intends that Heads of the Bench will consider the complaints in the 
way that they always have; informally and behind closed doors. 119 
2 The Judicial Conduct Panel 
When the Commissioner recommends the formation of a Conduct Panel, 
the Attorney-General may at any time appoint a panel.
120 The decision of the 
Attorney-General is discretionary. This means that even where the 
Commissioner decides that further investigation is warranted, the Attorney-
General may not accept this conclusion. The Attorney-General does not have 
unfettered discretion however, as the ability to form a Conduct Panel is 
contingent on a positive recommendation by the Commissioner. 121 
When appointing a Conduct Panel the Attorney-General must consult 
with the Chief Justice on the proposed membership.
122 A Conduct Panel is to 
comprise of three members and although the exact composition may vary, the 
Act specifies that there must be two members with legal qualifications and one 
lay member. While the two legally qualified members may either be current 
judges, retired judges, barristers or solicitors, it is compulsory that either a judge 
. d. d . h I 123 or a retire JU ge sits on t e pane . 
Once a Conduct Panel is formed, its role is to inquire into, and report on, 
the matters that have been referred to it by the Attorney-General. In inquiring 
11 8 Minor complaints are negatively defined in that they are not di missed, and not serious 
enough to warrant removal, they are minor complaints. 
119 Office of the Associate Minister of Justice "Enhancing Public Confidence in the Judiciary" 
(23 January 2003) 3. 
120 Judicial Conduct Comm.issioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 21 (I). 
121 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 21 (I). 
122 Judicial Conduct Conun.i ssioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 21 (2). 
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into the referred matters , the Conduct Panel must hold a hearing,
124 where the 
judge concerned is entitled to appear and speak. 125 
The Conduct Panel must hold hearings in public unless it decides to hold 
a hearing in private. The Panel can hold the hearing in private where it feels it 
is proper to do so having regard to the interest of any person and the public 
interest. 126 The Conduct Panel also has the discretion to decide whether any 
restrictions should be placed on the publication of any report, any account of 
any part of the proceedings, and any document produced at the hearing. The 
Conduct Panel can also prohibit the publication of the judge's name or the 
d ·1 f in eta1 so any person . 
The decision of the Conduct Panel to hold a hearing, or any part thereof, 
in private or to restrict the publication of any information, is not final. The Act 
provides that any person may appeal to the Court of Appeal concerning any 
decision that the Conduct Panel makes in regard to the hearing and the 
publication of material. 128 This ability to appeal cuts both ways in that a person 
may appeal when the Conduct Panel decides not to exercise the choice to hold a 
hearing in private or to restrict publication. 
After the hearing, the Conduct Panel reports to the Attorney-General its 
findings of fact, its opinion as to whether consideration of removal is justified, 
and the reasons for the conclusion. 129 Where the Panel finds that consideration 
of removal is justified, the Attorney-General has "absolute discretion" as to 
whether to take steps to initiate the removal of that judge from office. 
130 The 
Attorney-General cannot take steps to initiate removal of a judge however, in 
the absence of a report by the Conduct Panel recommending that consideration 
124 Judicial Conduct Conunissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 24(2). 
125 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 27( I). 
126 Judicial Conduct Comrnissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 29. 
127 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Pane l Act 2004, s 30. 
128 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Pane l Act 2004, s 3 1. 
129 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Pane l Act 2004, s 32. 
130 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 3 1(1 ). 
of removal is warranted. 131 This is an important restriction on the role that the 
Attorney-General can play. 
Where the Attorney-General does take steps to remove a judge, the Act 
sets out the process for this .132 In the case of High Court, Court of Appeal, 
Supreme Court and Employment Court Judges, a motion must be made in 
Parliament to the Governor-General to remove a Judge. The Government 
intends that all a motion by Parliament requires is a majority vote. 133 In the case 
of Associate Judges and other judges, the Attorney-General advises the 
Governor-General to dismiss a judge. New Zealand has not followed Canada 
where the ability of Parliament to remove a judge, without a recommendation 
by the Council, is preserved. 
VI ANALYSIS OF THE MINOR COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE 
This section analyses the complaints that fall in the middle of the 
hierarchy created under the Act. They are the minor complaints that are 
channelled to the Head of the Bench. It asks whether the new procedure 
addresses the perceived problems with the informal process, or whether the 
change is superficial and greater changes should have been made. 
In essence, the Act retains the status quo in relation to the processing of 
minor complaints. The two modifications are that the Commissioner makes the 
first decision about all complaints of judicial misconduct, and that the power of 
the Head of the Bench to deal with complaints now has a statutory basis. 
A Strengths of the Procedure 
Through the office of the Commissioner, the complaints procedure 
should now be a more obvious mechanism to the public . While incorporation 
into statute does not automatically mean that the public will have a greater 
131 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 3 1 (2). 
132 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, chedule l. 
133 Office of the Associate Minister of Justi ce, above n 119, 3. 
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awareness of the system, the existence of a dedicated office for the receipt and 
processing of complaints should generate greater publicity of the system. If the 
complaints system is more obvious to the public, this thereby ensures that it is 
more accessible. Accessibility is immensely important if there is to be 
meaningful accountability. 
At the point the Commissioner considers the complaint, much greater 
transparency surrounds the treatment of complaints. Not only does the 
Commissioner have a statutory obligation to consider complaints, the statute 
sets out both the steps that the Commissioner can take in the investigation and 
the three options of decision that are open to the Commissioner. 134 
It is very important that the statute sets out the grounds for dismissal 
because dissatisfaction with the informal complaints procedure must have been 
high when the Head of the Bench dismissed complaints and the complainant did 
not understand why. Where a complaint fails to meet the required threshold for 
consideration under section 16, 135 the Commissioner must notify the 
complainant that the complaint has been dismissed, and the grounds on which 
that decision was made. 136 Admittedly, the complainants will not have 
complete understanding of the decision because they will not have access to the 
information that the Commissioner based the decision on. 
Nevertheless, the process is more inclusive. 
While the public is concerned that judges are held accountable, it has an 
even greater concern that steps are taken to minimise future misconduct. A 
problem raised above was that the system for collecting data has not been 
reliable. This was partly because complaints were made to several bodies, but 
mostly because the explicit task of gathering reliable data was not assigned to a 
particular person. 
134 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 15. 
135 Grounds for dismissal include that the complaint is not within the Commissioner's 
jurisdiction; that it has no bearing on judicial functions and judicial duties; that it is frivolous, 
vexatious or not in good faith; that the subjec t matter of the complaint is trivial; that the 
complaint concerns a judicial decision or function, that is or was subject to a ri ght of appeal or 
review. 
136 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judici a l Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 16(2). 
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The Act takes the first step towards improvement in this area, because 
part of the role of the Commissioner is to present an annual report to the 
Attorney-General who can then choose to table it in Parliament. 137 Amongst 
other things, the report must contain the number and types of complaints 
received during the year, and the outcomes of those complaints. 138 The 
information gathered about the types of complaints that are made at the lower 
end of the scale thereby allows targeted judicial education. 
B Should the Act Have Gone Further? 
Reference to the passage of minor complaints in the Act stops at the 
point that complaints are forwarded to the Head of the Bench, and the silence 
about the process thereafter is very interesting. Several questions arise from 
this, and they are these; why does the reference stop at this point, and does this 
mean that the Act fails to address the most potent concerns identified with the 
informal complaints system? 
1 Failure to specify the procedure 
Members of Parliament rigorously questioned whether the Act could 
have achieved more, and argued that it does not make a significant change in the 
response to minor complaints. 139 For the Act does not set out a mandatory 
procedure for the Head of the Bench, and nor does is provide the Head of the 
Bench with powers of discipline. 
The greatest concern raised about the informal complaints system was 
the lack of transparency surrounding the process. As the Act does not set down 
a procedure for the Head of the Bench to follow, the opportunity to bring greater 
transparency to the process is lost. The position remains that the Head of the 
Bench is not obliged to follow a procedure when considering a complaint, that 
137 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, schedule 2, 9(2). 
138 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, schedule 2, I 0( 1 ). 
139 (11 May2004)617NZPD 12796. 
the consideration of the complaint is behind closed doors, and that the 
complainant is therefore effectively excluded from the process. 
Why does the Act go so far as to incorporate the informal complaints 
system in statute, and then fall short of giving clarity to the process from that 
point on? The answer to this is not straightforward, and little can be gained 
from debate in the House. A Departmental Report provided by the Ministry of 
Justice to the Justice and Electoral Committee does however, provide some 
insight on this point. The Ministry of Justice stated that in order to protect 
judicial independence, the handling of less serious complaints should be left in 
the hands of the judiciary, and the Head of the Bench should not be provided 
with a statutory power of decision. It is necessary to unpack this statement 
further. 
Regulation of judicial misconduct has always been within the province 
of the judiciary, except where the misconduct is of a nature that warrants 
removal. In that situation, Parliament reserved itself the power under the 
Constitution Act 1986 to make a motion for removal. In all other instances of 
misconduct the judiciary, and in particular the Head of the Bench, can exercise 
discretion in dealing with a complaint. If the legislature were to step in and set 
down how the Head of the Bench were to proceed with a complaint, this would 
mean that the legislature is encroaching on the traditional province of the 
judiciary. 
Stipulating how the judiciary must manage instances of judicial 
misconduct could also breach individual independence. Judicial independence 
means that a judge in their adjudicative function must only be subject to his or 
her conscience and the law .
140 Judges must not be subject to irrelevant 
pressures, including pressures from the Head of the Bench.
141 The Head of the 
i.io Albena ( Provincial Co11r1 Judge) v Alberta (Provincial Court Chief Judge) [ 1999] ABQB 
309, para 130. 
i.ii Alberta (Provincial Court Judge) v Alberta (Provincial Court Chief Judge), above n 140, 
para 152. 
Bench is broadly characterised as first among equals, 142 and does have some 
responsibility for the judges on the same bench. If formal powers of decision-
making are given to the Head of the Bench in respect of judicial conduct 
however, this moves from the conception of first among equals and creates a 
hierarchy where the Head of the Bench is placed in a position of superiority. 
Moreover, providing the Head of the Bench with formal decision-
making powers might open the judiciary up to undue pressure from outside. 
Where the powers of the Head of the Bench are clearly set out, the public has a 
greater ability to question the decision that the Head of the Bench reached and 
criticise it. 
The role of the Head of the Bench looking into complaints informally, 
and playing a counselling role, is much more in line both with the conception of 
first among equals and judicial independence. In this role, the Head of the 
Bench has the ability to look into a complaint, and the ability to provide 
assistance. Yet they cannot force any behaviour on the part of the judge 
concerned. 
The Ministry of Justice felt that a further reason for not setting out a 
defined procedure in the Act was that doing so could expose the Head of the 
Bench to the possibility of judicial review. Judicial review is not desirable in 
light of the fact that the Head of the Bench considers complaints of minor 
misconduct where the misconduct does not impact on the result of a case. A 
judicial review proceeding could cause collateral damage through the publicity 
that it creates. The risk of adverse publicity is not justified when complaints are 
at the lower end of the scale. 
The Ministry of Justice felt that judicial review would be a distinct 
possibility if the Act had set out an express obligation on the Head of the Bench 
IH Alberta ( Provincial Court Judge) v Alberta ( Provincial Court Chief Judge), above n 140, 
para 90. 
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to make a decision, or to take action on the complaint. 143 If Head of the Bench 
had the power not only to make a decision, but the ability to also act on that 
decision, this could be a statutory power of decision. Under section 4 of the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972, the courts have the ability to review the 
exercise of statutory powers of decision. 144 
The only reference to the Head of the Bench put in the Act was therefore 
in the form of a statutory link, and the Ministry of Justice believes the likelihood 
of judicial review is minimal. It argues that as the Head of the Bench does not 
have any express power of decision, there should be no right of judicial review. 
This conclusion is not beyond doubt however, and it is necessary to work 
through whether there could be review. 
Does the Act confer an implicit statutory power of decision? The Act 
contemplates that the Commissioner can pass complaints on to the Head of the 
Bench, and this includes the Head of the Bench within the statutory complaints 
process. The important issue is what power the Head of the Bench has in this 
process, and whether the Head of the Bench in fact has the power to make a 
"decision" as required by the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
As the Commissioner can pass on a complaint to the Head of the Bench, 
there is, at the least, an implicit duty on the Head of the Bench to consider the 
complaint. That alone, is not a power of decision. Where the Head of the 
Bench looks into a complaint, and reaches the conclusion that there has been 
misconduct, this is closer to a power of decision. The Courts require more 
however than the mere power to decide, they require an exercise of power that 
has a final dete1minative effect. 145 The Court of Appeal held in Daemar v 
Gilliand that where the decision does not finally determine the rights and 
obligations of a person, it is not reviewable. The Head of the Bench has no 
formal power over the judge concerned and therefore any decision about 
misconduct does not have a final determinative effect. 
14 3 Ministry of Justice " Departmental Report on Part One of the Judicial Matters Bill" (17 
March 2004) 21 [" Departmental Report on Part One of the Judicial Matters Bill"]. 
144 Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 4. 
145 Dae111ar v Gilliand (1979] 2 NZLR 7, 15 McMullin J. 
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(a) Comparative analysis 
Canada and New South Wales have different procedures for minor 
complaints, both from the New Zealand system of referring complaints to the 
Head of the Bench, and from each other. The New Zealand procedure falls in 
the middle of the spectrum, with the Canadian system focussing Jess on minor 
complaints, and New South Wales providing for more extensive consideration. 
When a complaint is made in Canada, the designated Chair of the 
Judicial Conduct Committee conducts the preliminary investigation of the 
complaint. 146 After the review, the Chair may dismiss the complaint either 
because it is trivial, vexatious or without substance, or because the conduct of 
the judge is not inappropriate enough to warrant consideration of removal. 
147 
The fact that the Chair can dismiss those complaints where there has 
been inappropriate or improper conduct creates an important distinction with the 
New Zealand Act. On the one hand, the complaint is substantiated and is 
therefore warranted, and on the other, the complaint is dismissed. This mixed 
message could leave the complainant feeling that the complaint has not been 
addressed. While our procedure involving the Head of the Bench may not 
necessarily provide greater consideration of the complaint, where the complaint 
is substantiated, the complainant is notified of this. Even though the Head of 
the Bench may not take any action, the mere fact that a complaint is upheld 
could positively influence the public perception of the complaints procedure. 
The New South Wales process provides an interesting contrast. When a 
complaint is made to the Commission, the Commission must carry out a 
preliminary examination of it, and classifies the complaint as minor or serious 
where the complaint is not dismissed.
148 All complaints classified as minor or 
146 Canadian Judicial Council By-laws, 47. 
147 Canadian Judicial Council By-laws, 50. 
148 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 19. 
35 
serious are then referred to the Conduct Division. 149 The Commission can 
choose however, to refer a minor complaint to the relevant head of jurisdiction 
where they believe that the complaint does not warrant consideration by the 
Conduct Division. 
150 When this happens, the legislation does not set out the 
process from that point on. 
When a mmor complaint is referred to the Conduct Division, the 
Conduct Division conducts an examination of the complaint in private, as far as 
that is practicable. 151 Where the Conduct Division decides that a hearing is 
necessary, the hearing is heard in private. 152
 
The Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) strikes a different balance to our 
Act through the provision that minor complaints can be referred to the Conduct 
Division. As the Conduct Division, a panel of three judicial officers, can 
investigate minor complaints, the Act provides for more comprehensive 
consideration of minor complaints. Moreover, a panel has the appearance of 
being a more neutral mechanism for examining complaints than the Head of the 
Bench in the New Zealand process. Even though an investigation, and any 
subsequent hearing, is carried out in private, the simple fact that a panel 
considers the complaint should enhance public confidence in the process. 
The key question is whether the New South Wales process strikes a 
more appropriate balance than the New Zealand Act? On the one hand, the 
New South Wales process is likely to attract greater public confidence in the 
investigation of complaints, yet on the other, it is also more likely to have 
implications for judicial independence. The more that the behaviour of a judge 
is scrutinised through a fonnal process, the greater the likelihood that judges 
will not feel they have complete freedom in carrying out judicial duties. 
Where the misconduct is not of a nature to warrant consideration of 
removal, it is not worth risking any loss to judicial independence. As the New 
149 Judicial Officers Act 1986 ( SW), s 21. 
150 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 21. 
151 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 23. 
152 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW), s 24(3). 
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Zealand Law Society comments, if there is a loss in accountability through an 
informal complaints system, the public must accept that as a possible 
disadvantage off-set by the greater benefit of an independent judiciary. 
153 
2 Formal powers of discipline 
Members of Parliament criticised the Judicial Matters Bill on the 
grounds that it failed to give the Head of the Bench any formal disciplinary 
powers . Richard Worth MP argued that things "could have been done- censure, 
public apology, required counselling, but this Government did not have the 
appetite to take that step". 154 The argument that the Head of the Bench should 
be provided with disciplinary powers is a contentious one. 
Recently, the New Zealand Chief Justice Hon Sian Elias commented that 
"the Act of Settlement removal for cause by Parliament remains the only formal 
sanction that can be imposed consistently with" judicial independence. 
155 The 
High Court and Court of Appeal Judges, in their submission , argued strongly 
against any formal sanctions. 156 The concern with formal powers is that they 
can infringe the individual independence of judges, and adversely affect public 
confidence in the administration of justice. 
Where the Head of the Bench is given formal powers over a judge, this 
clearly places the Head of the Bench in a position of authority. The Head of the 
Bench can decide whether to discipline a judge and in theory, could use this 
power of decision to influence another judge's behaviour. Where the power of 
discipline is in fact exercised, this could also have implications for individual 
independence. For a judge who is formally disciplined, and must caITy on with 
his or her adjudicative functions , may feel hesitant from that point on. 
153 New Zealand Law Society, above n 28, para 18. 
154 ( I J May 2004) 6 I 7 NZPD 12796. 
155 Elias, above n 39, 9. 
156 Judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal "Submission of the Judges of the High Court 
and Court of Appeal on the Judicial Matters Bill" 10. 
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Formal sanctions could negatively impact on public confidence in the 
judiciary. Where a judge is formally sanctioned, through a required public 
apology or a reprimand, this will affect public confidence in the ability of the 
judge. As noted in the Canadian context, a "reprimanded judge is a weakened 
judge: such judge will find it difficult to perform judicial duties and will be 
faced with a loss of confidence on the part of the public and litigants" .
157 
Where public confidence in a judge has been lost, this has wider implications 
for public confidence in the judiciary. 
(a) Comparative analysis 
The role that the Head of Bench plays, without formal powers of 
discipline, mirrors the role of the head of jurisdiction in New South Wales. 
Under the Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) the Head of the Bench has a role in 
considering complaints, and does not have any formal power to respond where 
the complaint is substantiated. 
The Canadian legislation 1s not directly on point given that mmor 
complaints are dismissed from the system. The Canadian legislation is 
nevertheless worth comparing because of the provision that, at several points 
through the process, the Canadian Judicial Council can express disapproval of a 
judge's conduct. 158 Disapproval can even be expressed where the conduct is 
inappropriate and is dismissed from further consideration. In itself, a public 
expression of disapproval is a strong measure, and will have an impact on the 
judge concerned. The fact that that it is the Council expressing disapproval is 
important because the Council is further removed from the judge concerned 
than a Head of Bench would be. 
The Government deliberately chose not to incorporate sanctions in the 
New Zealand legislation, and this was undoubtedly the correct choice. The role 
that the Head of the Bench plays currently, which is close to a counselling role, 
157 Leo Barry "Judicial Free Speech and Judicial Discipline: A Trial Judge's Perspective on 
Judicial Independence" (1996) U NB LJ 79. 84. 
158 See Canadian Judicial By-Laws. 
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can achieve a desirable result. Where appropriate, the Head of the Bench will 
encourage the Judge to make an apology to the complainant. More importantly, 
the Head of the Bench can organise education for the judge to minimise the 
chance that the misbehaviour is repeated. The focus, in these cases of minor 
misconduct, should be on giving appropriate help to the judge rather than 
publicly on diminishing them. 
C Conclusion on the Minor Complaints Procedure 
There is little doubt that the legislation attempts to walk a fine line in 
relation to minor complaints. It seeks to increase accountability and 
transparency, and to protect judicial independence. The Act will not satisfy 
members of the public who demand undiluted accountability. Accountability 
and transparency are increased only insofar as the Commissioner deals with the 
complaints at the initial stage. The Act does little to address the concerns 
members of the public have with the closed door approach of the Head of the 
Bench. 
The Act takes the con-ect approach. Where judicial misconduct is at the 
lower end of the spectrum, and has not impacted on the result of a case, a formal 
procedure is unnecessary and could even be harmful. Yes judges should be held 
to account. The public has to accept however, that judges are human and will 
make mistakes. They should not be put through a hearing every time that they 
have misbehaved, and indeed every time it is alleged that they have 
misbehaved. A formal process shou ld on ly be engaged where the misconduct is 
serious enough that it could lead to di'smissal. If a formal process is engaged for 
minor complaints, this places the fundamental principle of judicial 
independence at risk. 
VII COMPLAINTS THAT COULD JUSTIFY DISMISSAL 
The driving motivation behind the Act was to establish a procedure that 
must precede removal of a judge. This section analyses the removal procedures 
and assesses how, and whether, the Act balances independence and 
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accountability. While significant protections for the judge are built into the 
complaints process, and there is public accountability, the identified concern is 
the transferral of power from parliament to the executive over the tenure of a 
judge. 
A Protection for the Judge and Judicial Independence 
One of the most serious concerns with the ad hoe commissions set up in 
Australia and Canada was the lack of protection provided for the judge at the 
centre of the inquiry. It is absolutely necessary that protection for the judge is 
built into the complaints system because a judge, just like every other citizen, 
has the right to expect a fair trial. Protection for the individual judge will go 
some way to ensuring that the system cannot be used to erode judicial 
independence. 
One of the stated purposes of the Act is to provide a fair process that 
recognises and protects the requirements of natural justice.
159 The Act does 
impose obligations on the Commissioner and the Panel to act independently and 
in accordance with natural justice. 160 Obligations alone are not sufficient 
protection, and this is recognised through the substantive protections that are 
built into the Act. 
The Act ensures that the judge is put in a position to defend any 
allegation. As soon as a complaint is made to the Commissioner, and before 
any preliminary investigation is undertaken, the Commissioner will send written 
notification to the judge. 161 While sending a copy of the complaint to the judge 
is not automatic, the judge is entitled to request this.
162 The only instance where 
the judge is not be immediately notified of the complaint is when the 
Commissioner, after consultation with the Head of the Bench, is satisfied that 
. d" d" 163 taking that step may preJu ice court procee mgs. In most circumstances 
159 Judicial Conduct Conrn1issioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 4. 
160 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 9. 
161 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 200-l, s 14(1) 
162 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 14(3). 
163 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, 14(6). 
then, the judge has adequate warnmg of the complaint and can prepare a 
response to the allegation if indeed it does proceed to the investigation stage. 
A judge is entitled to appear and speak at the hearing, and is also entitled 
to representation. 164 The option of representation is strengthened by the fact 
that the office of the Commissioner will meet the judge's "reasonable costs" of 
representation. 165 This provision is very interesting because it is unlike most 
cases where the parties meet the legal costs themselves, and may only receive 
payment for costs if they win the case. It is appropriate however, because it 
recognises that a hearing can place a large burden on the judge. A hearing 
moreover that will not arise as an incident of most jobs; it arises due to the 
particular nature of judicial office. A judge should not therefore have to bear 
the cost of representation, particularly where the Commission does not 
recommend removal. 
There is no equivalent provision for payment in either the Judicial 
Officers Act 1986 (NSW) or the Judges Act 1971. The New South Wales 
Commission specifically commented on this omission and recommended that 
judicial officers in New South Wales be provided with financial assistance 
because of the possibility that some judges might resign rather than bear the cost 
f h · 166 o a eanng. 
In addition to the availability of representation for the Judge, the 
Attorney-General must appoint a person to act as special council in an 
inquiry .167 There is an equivalent provision in Canada for the Chair to appoint 
an independent counsel when the Inquiry Committee holds a hearing. 
168 The 
special counsel under the New Zealand Act is required to present the 
allegations, and may make submissions on any questions of procedure and 
applicable law. 169 The Act stipulates that the special counsel must perform his 
164 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 27( I) . 
165 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 27(2). 
166 Morabito, above n 5, 494. 
167 Judicial Conduct Commi ssioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 28( I) . 
168 Canadian Judicial Council Bylaws 61. 
169 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2204, s 28(2). 
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or her duties impartially and act in accordance with the public interest. 170 The 
special counsel should assure that a balanced approach to the misconduct is 
taken at the hearing. 
The inclusion of the special council does give the hearing the appearance 
of an adversarial process. Most other aspects of the procedure indicate 
however, that this is not an adversarial process where the complainant is pitted 
against the judge. In fact the Act does not specifically provide that the 
complainant is even included in the hearing, although this possibility is left 
open. 171 The process is instead focussed on assessing whether the judge is fit to 
continue in office. 
In Canada, the Supreme Court commented on the purpose of the 
Canadian Judicial Council while considering a judicial review application. The 
Court firmly concluded that the purpose of a hearing is to find out whether 
misbehaviour is serious enough to warrant removal, 
172 it is not designed to 
enforce the rights of complainants, or to provide them with redress.
173 The New 
Zealand Act is designed along very similar lines and so the focus must be very 
similar. 
The Act has wide confidentiality prov1s1ons, and also allows the 
Conduct Panel to restrict the information it believes should not enter the public 
arena. 174 The reason confidentiality provisions are important is that when the 
Conduct Panel does not recommend the removal of the judge, that judge will 
have to return to judicial duties. If the allegations become public , the credibility 
of the judge may remain tarnished even where the Commission has found that 
the complaint is not substantiated. Confidentiality, up until the point of a public 
hearing is desirable because it may allow a judge to return to duties with public 
confidence in their ability intact. 
170 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Pane l Act 2004, s 28(3). 
171 Under section 28(4), with the consent of the Panel, any other person may appear at the 
hearing and may be represented by counsel. 
172 Taylor v Canada (Auomey-General) (2003] CarswellNat 2874, para 76 Evan J. 
173 Taylor v Canada (Auomey-General), above n 172, para 82. 
174 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 30(1). 
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The Commissioner has a duty to keep confidential all matters that "come 
to their knowledge in the performance of' his or her functions.
175 
Confidentiality therefore attaches to the complaint as soon as the Commissioner 
receives it. The Chief Executive of the New South Wales Commission 
supported confidentiality obligations at this stage, noting the risk of harm to the 
judiciary if information was released at the beginning. 176 The Conduct Panel 
also has powers to restrict the publication of the report, any account of the 
proceedings, any documents produced at the hearing, and the name or affairs of 
any person. 177 Where a person breaches a restriction order, he or she is liable to 
afine. 178 
The New Zealand Act has more extensive confidentiality provisions than 
the New South Wales system. There is criticism in New South Wales over the 
fact that their confidentiality provisions do not kick in as soon as a complaint is 
made to the Commission. That is the period when there is most likely to be 
publicity . 179 
The weakness with the confidentiality provisions both in the New 
Zealand Act, and in New South Wales, is that they are unlikely to be adequate 
protection in the face of a determined complainant. Canada illustrates the fact 
that the person with the greatest incentive to publicise the complaint, is the 
complainant. In Canada, "militant members of interest groups regularly 
scrutinize the comments of judges" for insensitive and "politically incorrect" 
statements. 180 It is in their interests to publicise the allegations, and the 
publicity is likely to be one sided. Publicity surrounding such complaints can 
therefore cause a lot of damage to the reputation of the judge. 
The reality is that a complaints system cannot wholly restrict publicity 
about allegations of misconduct. In fact, there are several reasons why a 
complaints procedure should not even attempt to do so. Firstly, to impose an 
175 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s I 9(l)(a). 
176 "Departmental Report on Part One of the Judicial Matters Bi II", above n 143, 7. 
177 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 30. 
178 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 30(6). 
179 Morabito, above n 5, 498. 
180 Barry, above n 157, 87. 
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obligation of confidentiality on the complainant restricts freedom of expression. 
Secondly, wholesale confidentiality provisions run counter to the aims of the 
Act which are to implement an open and transparent complaints procedure. 
A further protection in the Act is the multi-layered procedure that has to 
be followed before a Parliament can make a motion for dismissal. Before 
Parliament even has the ability to make a motion, the complaint must pass 
through the Commissioner who must recommend the formation of a Conduct 
Panel, the Attorney-General who must agree to form the Conduct Panel, the 
Conduct Panel who must recommend that consideration of dismissal is 
warranted, and finally the Attorney-General again who must agree to present the 
Report to Parliament. This multi-layered approach, which is similar in form to 
the New South Wales and Canadian procedures, ensures that judges cannot be 
removed simply because they are out of favour with one person or group. A 
number of people, holding varying positions, must agree to the dismissal of a 
judge. 
B Public Confidence in Judicial Accountability 
In providing protection for the judge, will this have the unintended 
consequence of lessening public confidence in the process? The Act does 
address this possibility by specifically directing several provisions towards 
increasing public confidence. 
Our court system is premised on the basis that for the public to have 
confidence in the courts, justice must be delivered openly. Therefore, for the 
public to have confidence in the complaints system, it must be able to see the 
workings of the Conduct Panel. That is why the hearings of the Conduct Panel 
must be carried out in public, except where the Panel believes it is more 
appropriate to hold a hearing in private.
181 In deciding to hold a hearing in 
18 1 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 29(2). 
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private, the Panel must consider the interest of any person, including the privacy 
of the complainant, and the public interest. 182 
The decision to hold a part, or the whole, of a hearing in private should 
be sparingly used, because a hearing into the misconduct of a judge is certainly 
in the legitimate public interest. Holding a hearing in private would raise the 
curiosity of the public, and cast doubts over the handling of the complaint by the 
Panel. 
The inclusion of the lay member on the Conduct Panel should attract 
public confidence in the process. It is interesting that New Zealand chose to 
depart from both New South Wales and Canada in specifying that there must be 
one lay member. All members of a Conduct Division in New South Wales are 
judicial officers, and all members of any Inquiry Committee in Canada are 
judges. 
Canadian commentators have discussed the relative merits of a lay 
member. Professor Friedland, who has written extensively on the Canadian 
complaints system, believes that lay members should be added to the mix in 
Canada. 183 An argument for lay inclusion is that it enhances the public 
perception that a hearing into judicial misconduct is more impartial; that it is not 
a case of judges merely policing themselves. 
Lay inclusion has however, been questioned. Chief Justice Lamer in 
particular, believes that lay inclusion is little more than "window-dressing",
184 
and that it will not affect the public perception in the rightness or wrongness of 
the decision. While that may be true on a case-by-case basis, a lay member 
should create a more general impression that the system is neutral. In itself, this 
is important. 
182 Judicial Conduct Commi ssioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 29(2) . 
183 Lamer, above n 27 , I 5. 
18~ Lamer, above n 27 , 16. 
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An important question in regards to the lay member is whether this will 
affect the quality of the panel. Judges should expect that a hearing into 
misconduct is conducted by those most qualified for the task. Those sitting on a 
panel are required to grapple with the constitutional principles of judicial 
independence, accountability, and public confidence in the administration of 
j ustice. 185 A lay member, who has no expertise in the area, may struggle with 
this. 186 A better solution in New Zealand may have been to leave the possibility 
of a lay member open, but not to provide that the presence of a lay member is 
mandatory. 
Until the Act is used, it is not clear whether the measures of public 
hearings and the inclusion of the lay member will be sufficient to attract public 
confidence in the complaints procedure. How the Commissioner and the 
Attorney-General fulfil their roles is likely to have the strongest influence on 
public confidence. The Commissioner has power over which complaints will 
proceed to an investigation stage. If the Commissioner is reluctant to pass 
complaints through the investigation process, the public will not feel that the 
Act is serving its purpose. Similarly where the Attorney-General exercises the 
discretion not to initiate steps of removal when the Conduct Panel makes a 
positive recommendation, this would legitimately cause a loss of public 
confidence. 
C Constitutional Implications 
"The Judicial Matters Bill bears upon the balances struck by the New 
Zealand constitution and the functions of the judiciary in a society based upon 
1 ,, 187 aw. How the Act alters the balance between the three branches of 
Government is a key issue. The central questions are whether the addition of 
the complaints system transfers power from Parliament to the Executive, and 
whether this is appropriate. 
185 Moreau-Berube, above n 14, para 45. 
186 lt will be particularly hard for a lay member because the Conduct Panel is not a standing 
Panel , it will be formed in an ad hoe manner. Therefore the lay member will not gain 
experience. 
187 Judges of the High Court and Court of Appeal, above n 156, I. 
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Before the new complaints system, Parliament had the right to make a 
motion to remove a judge from office on the grounds of misbehaviour or 
incapacity. While the Act preserves the motion for removal, the notable 
difference is that Parliament has lost the right to initiate this motion. In the 
absence of a report by the Panel, and the agreement of the Attorney-General to 
initiate removal procedures, Parliament is powerless to act. 
188 
With District Court Judges, Parliament is not involved in the removal 
process. As was the case before the Act, the Governor-General removes a 
District Court Judge on the recommendation of the Attorney-General. The 
Government had intended to unify the removal procedures, so that all judges 
could only be removed after a motion by Parliament. 189 It is not clear why this 
did not happen. 
While Parliament has never actually exercised its right to remove a 
judge in New Zealand, it clearly feels that the ability to do so is constitutionally 
important. 190 Judges derive their authority and legitimacy from the support of 
the people. Therefore Parliament, the people's representative, is the appropriate 
body to initiate removal. It should remove a judge when it deems that the 
misconduct of a judge means that the judge has lost the support of the people. 
Members of Parliament argue that the Government, through the new 
complaints system, now has the ability to stop Parliament exercising its 
constitutional right. It is necessary to analyse how much control Parliament had 
over the dismissal of a judge, and how much of that ability it has lost. 
Did the Government already control the removal of judges through the 
majority it has traditionally commanded over Parliament? It is likely it did 
when Parliament comprised only of two parties. Admittedly, this control has 
weakened with the advent of MMP. It is now not always the case that the 
188 Judicial Conduct Commi ss ioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 33(2). 
189 Cabinet Business Conunittee "Enhancing Public Confidence in the Judiciary" (24 January 
2003) 3. 
190 (11 May2004)617NZPD 12803. 
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Government has a majority in Parliament, and when it does, this is usually in 
coalition. Had Parliament exercised its right under MMP, its decision might 
have allowed more cross-party involvement. Therefore Parliament, rather than 
the Government, would hold the power to initiate and decide on removal. 
While Parliament loses the right to initiate the removal of a judge, it 
does not lose the right to discuss the conduct of a judge. Parliament, as the 
sovereign body, will always have the right to discuss questions of public 
importance. How rigorous should the discussion be? By convention, Members 
of Parliament exercise restraint in discussing a case that is going through the 
courts so that they do not usurp the judicial function. 
191 While the Conduct 
Panel is not exercising the traditional judicial function, Parliament would 
nevertheless have to be careful. In discussing an allegation of misconduct, 
Parliament must not be seen to prejudice the independence of the judicial 
complaints process. 
Parliament is also not losing ability to conduct investigations into the 
conduct of a judge. Hon Margaret Wilson MP stated, before the passing of the 
Act, that Parliament could carry out any further investigations it thought 
necessary. 192 It is anticipated however, that a report by the Conduct Panel will 
provide Parliament with all the infonnation necessary to make a decision. 
Importantly, in the case of High Court Judges and Employment Court 
Judges, Parliament remains the ultimate arbiter under the Act. If there is a 
recommendation for removal by the Panel, and the Attorney-General does not 
veto placing the report before Parliament, Parliament has absolute freedom as to 
whether it will accept the recommendation . If Parliament was not to accept the 
recommendation, the public reaction would be interesting. An Australian 
commentator has suggested that the public would see Parliament's decision as 
solely motivated by political factors rather than the merits of the case.
193 
191 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 200 I) 293. 
192 Office of the Associate Minister of Justice, above n 119, 4. 
193 Morabito, above n 5, 503. 
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The greatest concern with the diminished role of Parliament is that the 
Government now has increased influence over the tenure of judges. The 
problem is not that the Act provides the Government with an increased ability to 
dismiss a judge. In fact, the statutory complaints system has lessened the 
possibility of arbitrary dismissal of a judge. The problem is rather that the 
Government, through the Attorney-General, now has the ability to stop the 
dismissal of a judge that it wants to keep in office. 
The Act is designed in such a way that the Attorney-General is able to 
stop the process at several points . Firstly, when the Commissioner recommends 
that a Panel should be formed, the Attorney-General has the choice as to 
whether to act on the recommendation. 194 Secondly, when a Panel recommends 
consideration of removal , the Act provides that the "Attorney-General must 
determine, at his or her absolute discretion , whether to take steps to initiate" the 
19-
removal of the Judge. ) 
It is possible to characterise the role of the Attorney-General both 
positively and negatively. Arguably, the involvement of the Attorney-General 
adds further protection for the Judge against an arbitrary dismissal , because the 
Attorney-General is an additional person that must agree to the course of action 
before the judge is dismissed. The Attorney-General is seen as the appropriate 
person to do this because of the traditional role that the Attorney-General plays 
as the protector of the judiciary. Taking the alternative view, the involvement 
of the Attorney-General is negative because it allows the Government to 
influence how a complaint will proceed. If, for any reason, the Government 
wants to keep a judge in office, it has the ability to do so. 
During debate in the House, Steven Franks MP certainly took the latter 
view. He claimed, in strong terms, that the Act snookers "the possibility of 
Parliament taking this out of the hands of an Attorney-General who is colluding 
194 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Pane l Act 2004, s 20. 
195 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Pane l Act 2004, s 33. 
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with the judiciary".
196 He is therefore arguing that the Act allows the Attorney-
General to influence the judiciary. 
It is interesting that the power we give to the Attorney-General is not 
modelled on an equivalent provision in New South Wales. Where the Conduct 
Division in New South Wales finds that consideration of removal is justified, 
the reports are automatically laid before Parliament. 
197 There is clearly no 
ability for a member of the Executive in Canada to play this role either because 
the right of Parliament to remove a judge is preserved 
The Act should not have provided the Attorney-General with such a 
pivotal role under the complaints system. An aim of the complaints system is to 
set down a neutral and independent method of investigating judicial conduct, 
and the significant inclusion of the Attorney-General in the process is 
inconsistent with this. The "absolute discretion" that the Attorney-General has 
after the Conduct Panel has recommended that consideration of removal is 
justified, is particularly surprising. If the independent panel is intended to play 
a central role in the decision to remove a judge, a report recommending 
consideration of removal should always be placed before Parliament. While 
this does take away the protection of a further layer of agreement, this is 
necessary for the independence of the decision-making process. 
D Success of the Removal Procedure 
As far as possible, the Act has built in protection for any judge that goes 
through the complaints process. A conscious effort has been made to place 
judges in an effective position to defend themselves against an allegation of 
misconduct. Such protection is a strong step towards securing individual 
independence of the judiciary. Protection for the judge is carefully balanced 
against the need for the public to feel that there is effective accountability. The 
established procedure, the open nature of the hearing, and the inclusion of the 
lay member will all go towards securing public confidence in the process. 
196 (2 September 2003) 611 NZPD 8313. 
197 Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) s 29(3). 
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The removal of the right of Parliament to make a motion for removal is 
not cause for concern. In setting up a statutory removal procedure, it is 
necessary to take this right away from Parliament. For if Parliament retained 
the ability to initiate removal, it could side step the complaints procedure 
entirely. A difficulty with the Act does lie however, in the role that the 
Attorney-General has been given . While it is quite possible that an Attorney-
General will not abuse the role provided under the Act and exert influence over 
the judiciary, the ability to do so should not be provided. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The Government has attempted a formidable task with the Judicial 
Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004. It seeks to 
harmonise two principles frequently in tension ; judicial accountability and 
independence. The result is a delicate balance. 
The Act makes little change to the procedure for mmor complaints. It 
incorporates the informal complaints procedure where the Head of the Bench 
considers the complaint informally and confidentially. The failure to formalise 
this system will not attract support from members of the public who call for 
undiluted accountability. Public confidence should not however be 
determinative of the success of the procedure. Accountability is not an 
absolute, it must always be viewed in the wider context of an independent 
judiciary. The procedure for minor complaints is positive not because of the 
changes it makes, which are few, but for the balance it preserves. It allows an 
independent judiciary while at the same time providing an infom1al check on 
behaviour. 
The major initiative in the Act is the independent investigation process 
that must precede removal of a judge. The investigation procedure combines 
protection for the judge with a transparent and comprehensive hearing. Any 
power to look into the conduct of a judge is carefully dispersed between the 
Commissioner, the Conduct Panel , and the Attorney-General. The only 
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problem with the power given under the Act is the ability for the Attorney-
General to thwart the investigation process. 
The real success of the Act cannot be measured until it is put into 
practise. Provisions in an Act cannot guarantee that judges will be independent 
yet accountable. For when power is given to scrutinise the conduct of judges, it 
can always be manipulated. As far as possible however, the powers in the Act 
are carefully circumscribed. 
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